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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a Workman's Compensation case involving the claim of 
a dependent spouse. Mrs. Dahl, the wife of the deceased and 
Plaintiff-Appellant in this case, had filed a claim for 
dependent's benefits as a surviving spouse on December 12, 1985. 
On September 3, 1985, the Industrial Commission denied her claim 
and entered a Death Benefits Order finding there were no depen-
dents of the deceased at the time of his death. This appeal 
involves the Industrial Commission's denial of that claim. The 
case was tried before the Honorable Timothy C. Allen, 
Administrative Law Judge. The Findings oi Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order denying Mrs. Dahl's claim were entered on March 
17, 1986. Thereafter, Mrs. Dahl timely filed a Motion to Review 
Order of Administrative Law Judge on March 26, 1986. This Motion 
was denied by the Industrial Commission on May 21, 1986. She 
then timely filed her Petition for Review in the Supreme Court of 
Utah on June 19, 1986. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Marital History 
Cynthia Zoe Dahl and Steven Bradley Dahl were married on 
October 22, 1976 [R.31]. Mr. Dahl's employment with Revlon 
brought them to Utah in September of 1979, and they jointly 
purchased a home in Sandy [R.32] at 1151 South Hidden Valley 
Boulevard [R.30]. Both signed the loan documents as joint 
obligors [R.166]. In November of 1984, Mr. and Mrs. Dahl sep-
arated. As a result of her employment with Frontier Airlines, 
Mrs. Dahl temporarily left Salt Lake City and went to Denver, 
Colorado [R.37], taking only daily necessities with her and 
leaving her car and all other personal belongings at the parties1 
home in Sandy [R.38]. Mr. Dahl remained in Sandy in the marital 
residence, operating his business out of their home. 
Mrs. Dahl believed this separation was only temporary and 
that the parties merely needed some time to work things out 
[R.37]. During this period, the parties maintained telephone 
contact [R.39] and saw one another whenever Mr. Dahl traveled to 
Denver [R.39]. However, in January, 1985, Mr. Dahl initiated 
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uivorce proceedings [R.39]. In lieu of a temporary support 
order, it was agreed between counsel for the parties that Mr. 
Dahl would assume the mortgage payments on the parties1 residence 
in Sandy and make the payments on the parties1 indebtedness of 
approximately $7,000.00 [R.40, 70]. On July 23, 1985, at the 
insistence of Mr. Dahl, Mrs. Dahl signed a Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement prepared by Mr. Dahl's attorney, 
Frederick Green [R.40-43]. At no point did she discuss the 
signing of the Stipulation with her attorney, Mr. Paul Liapis. 
Mr. Liapis did not sign the agreement, although the agreement was 
prepared for his signature, as well as the parties and other 
counsel. The partially executed Settlement Agreement was filed 
on August 5, 1985, three days after Mr. Dahl's death by Frederick 
Green, counsel for Mr. Dahl. It provided, among other things, 
that Mr. Dahl would assume and pay the mortgage balance owed on 
the residence and hold Mrs. Dahl harmless. (A copy of this 
Agreement has been included in the Addendum to this Brief, marked 
Exhibit "A.") 
On August 2, 1985, Mr. Dahl was killed in a commercial 
airplane accident when he was travelling for his employer, 
Revlon, Inc. The parties were still married at that time; there 
had not been a divorce trial or hearing; no testimony had been 
given by either party relating to the allegations of the 
Complaint; and no Decree of Divorce had been entered [R.43]. 
Later, in November of 1985, Mrs. Dahl moved back into the 
family home and attempted to make monthly payments on the 
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mortgage. At the time of the hearing, her net salary was approx-
imately $1,200.00 per month [R.51]. The mortgage payment on the 
Sandy residence alone is $800.00 per month [R.44]. Mrs. Dahl's 
salary is insufficient to meet her obligations or support herself 
commensurate with the standard of living established by the 
parties during the marriage and pay the obligations her husband 
had agreed to pay [R.42-44]. 
On September 3, 19 85, the Industrial Commission entered a 
Death Benefits Order finding that there were no dependents of the 
deceased at the time of his death and that the sum of $30,000.00 
should be paid into the Default Indemnity Fund [R.2]. (A copy of 
that Order has been included in the Addendum to this Brief, 
marked Exhibit "B.") 
On December 12, 1985, Mrs. Dahl filed an Application for 
Death Benefits with the Industrial Commission for death benefits 
as the surviving dependent spouse of Mr. Dahl [R.9]. At a 
hearing on that Application the Administrative Law Judge found 
that Mr. Dahl was neither living with Mrs. Dahl at the time of 
his death, nor was he supporting her and affirmed the Commissioner's 
Order of September 3, 1985, denying Mrs. Dahl Dependent Death 
Benefits and dismissed her claim with prejudice [R.175-181]. (A 
copy of those Findings and Conclusions have been included in the 
Addendum to this Brief, marked Exhibit "C") The Industrial 
Commission then denied Mrs. Dahl's Motion to Review the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision on May 21, 1986 [R.192-195]. 
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(A copy of that Order of Denial has been included in the Addendum 
to this Brief, marked Exhibit "D.") 
Framing of Dependency Standard 
At the March 12, 1986, hearing, the Administrative Law Judge 
wanted to consider only whether or not the parties were married 
at the time of Mr. Dahl's death and not Mr. and Mrs. Dahlfs 
accustomed standard of living at the time of Mr. Dahlrs death for 
purposes of determining dependency under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. That position was made apparent when Mr. 
Gustin, Mrs. Dahl's attorney, offered the parties1 1985 tax 
returns as evidence and the following interchange occurred. 
MS. PIXTON: We have no objection to the 
f85 return, Your Honor. It shows her income. 
MR. GUSTIN: It shows her income, and it 
shows his income up until August. 
It establishes the standard of living to 
which she was accustomed to, in terms of the 
financial wherewithall of the two parties. 
THE COURT: But that's not an issue. 
MR. GUSTIN: Well, the issue is depen-
dency. And I think dependency is directly 
related to financial standard of living. At 
least according to the cases that we have, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I think the issue is not 
dependency. The issue is was she still 
married to the deceased on the date of his 
death. 
MR. GUSTIN: Well, I think that's 
established, Your Honor. That she was still 
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raarried. But the statute talks to the 
question of--
THE COURT: Well, I don't believe it. I 
take issue with that. I'm not convinced that 
that's established. Okay? No. 1, because 
the statute says, you know, the legal spouse. 
Right? 
MR. GUSTIN: That's correct. 
THE COURT: But the statute also says 
"living with the deceased at the time of 
death." 
MR. GUSTIN: That correct. 
THE COURT: Her testimony has been she 
was living in Aurora on August 2nd. 
MR. GUSTIN: That's correct. 
But the statute also says that if she is 
not living with the deceased at the time of 
the death, then the question of dependency is 
a question of fact to be determined by the 
Hearing Examiner. 
THE COURT: If we determine that she was 
still married. 
MR. GUSTIN: Correct. 
THE COURT: Because if she is not 
legally married, then the case law won't 
support an award. Right? 
MR. GUSTIN: Yes. 
Well, we have proof here, and I think 
there is no question of fact here, as to the 
fact that there was no divorce entered in 
this matter. 
(To Ms. Pixton.) I think Counsel will 
stipulate to that fact, will you not? 
MS. PIXTON: Yes. 
MR. GUSTIN: So there is no divorce that 
was ever entered. 
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MS. PIXTON: I think the question 
strictly is dependency. Ifm satisfied that 
there is technically a legal marriage. 
Because there is no Decree entered into 
District Court file with regard to separation 
or divorce. I think it's strictly a depen-
dency claim. 
THE COURT: All right [R.47-49]. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In spite of this explanation, the Administrative Law Judge 
failed to consider the evidence presented which related to Mr. 
Dahl's income and the standard of living the parties were enjoying 
at the time of Mr. Dahl's death [R.179], and the fact that Mr. 
Dahl had agreed to assume several significant marital obliga-
tions, including the home mortgage [R.39-40 and 166-167]. 
Exclusion of Mrs. Dahl's Current Financial 
Condition as a Direct Result of Mr. Dahl's Death 
The Administrative Law Judge also erroneously excluded 
evidence pertaining to Mrs. Dahl's current financial condition 
which resulted directly from Mr. Dahl's death. The first area of 
evidence excluded pertained to the mortgage payments on the 
couple's Sandy home. 
[MR. GUSTIN] Q After his death, 
what did you do with reference to the family 
home in Sandy? 
A I moved back into the family home 
in November of '85. 
Q And it's your primary residence, is 
it not? 
A Yes. 
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Q And you1re attempting to meet the 
mortgage payments on that house? 
A Yes, 
Q Are you able to do that? 
A No. 
Q Do you know how many months you're 
in arrears with reference to the payment of 
the mortgage on that property? 
A How many months? 
Q Yes. Or the total amount that is 
in arrears? 
A It's approximately $5,000.00. 
Q Have you been threatened by the 
mortgage holder to foreclose on the mortgage? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q And do you know to what extent the 
$7,000.00 worth of debts that are referred to 
in this Agreement were paid? 
A No. 
Q You haven't been furnished with an 
inventory of the estate? 
A No. 
Q You don't know what the status of 
that is? 
A No. 
Q Immediately prior to his death he 
was making the payments on the mortgage, was 
he not? 
A Yes. 
Q And it was your understanding that 
he would continue to make those? 
A Yes. 
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Q Now you're suffering the additional 
payment of that mortgage, as a result of his 
death; is that true? 
A Yes. 
Q How much are those mortgage payments? 
A They're now $800.00 a month. 
Q And what other obligations are you 
incurring with reference to the l^ ouse? 
MS. PIXTON: Your Honor, I'm going 
to object to this line of questioning. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. GUSTIN: Can we have a reason? 
MS. PIXTON: Well, I don't think 
its relevant to her condition now. I think 
her condition in August of 1985 is relevant, 
but her condition now has nothing to do with 
it. 
MR. GUSTIN: Well, I was asking 
what her condition was right after his death. 
THE COURT: That wasn't the question, 
Counsel. 
MR. GUSTIN: Q What was your 
situation at the time of his death, with 
reference to the payment of those mortgages? 
Did they become immediately due? 
A Yes. 
MS. PIXTON: Well, I'm going to 
object as to what occurred after his death. 
As of August 1st, the day before the death. 
1985 I think is relevant. Anything after 
that I would object to, as not being relevant 
as to her status of dependency [R.R.43-45]. 
The Administrative Law Judge sustained that objection and 
excluded evidence of Mrs. Dahl's current income and its inadequacy 
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in meeting obligations previously agreed to be assumed by Mr. 
Dahl with their combined incomes [R.166-167]. 
[MR. GUSTIN] Q Was it neces-
sary—in order to meet the financial obliga-
tions that you incurred during this marriage, 
and the mortgage payments—that Mr. Dahl make 
the mortgage payments and pay the debts that 
had been incurred? 
A Yes. 
Q How much did you earn— What is 
your take-home pay with Frontier Airlines 
now, Mrs. Dahl? 
A Approximately $1,200.00. 
Q $1,200.00 a month? 
A Yes. 
Q And would it be fair to say that 
the mortgage payments and the utility pay-
ments on the house total approximately a 
thousand dollars a month? 
A Correct. 
Q There is no way that you can meet 
that mortgage obligation on your income; is 
that correct? 
MS. PIXTON: Your Honor, I'm going 
to object again. Ms. Dahl has testified that 
she was not living in the house prior to the 
death of Mr. Dahl. 
If you want some evidence regarding what 
her expenses were on August 1, I would have 
no objection. Her expenses today I think are 
totally irrelevant to her dependency on 
August 1. 
THE COURT: Thatfs correct, Counsel, 
Sustained [R.51-52]. 
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At the time of the hearing, as well as at the time of Mr. Dahl's 
death, Mrs. Dahl was obligated to pay all mortgage payments on 
the marital residence and make such other payments necessary to 
preserve and maintain the home, the collateral pledged as security 
on the loan and also pay the debts listed on page 3 of the 
Property Settlement and Separation Agreement [R.167]. 
RULING OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
After each side rested, the Administrative Law Judge con-
cluded that, at the time of Steven Dahlfs death, the parties were 
not living together and Steven Dahl was not supporting Cynthia 
Dahl. Therefore, the Order of September 3, 1985, denying 
Dependent's Death Benefits to Cynthia Dahl was affirmed and her 
claim was dismissed with prejudice [R.175-181]. The Industrial 
Commission then affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's decision 
in all respects [R.192-195]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission 
erred in denying Dependent's Death Benefits to Cynthia Dahl under 
the Workman's Compensation Act after her husband was killed in 
the course of his employment. 
The Administrative Law Judge erroneously adopted a narrow 
construction of the word "support" to encompass only payments 
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such as alimony or monies paid for daily necessities and not 
payments related to debt assumption. The word "support" should 
have been construed more broadly to include a consideration of 
what joint debts Mr. Dahl was to pay and what effect his failure 
to do so would have on the lifestyle of Mrs. Dahl. In the case 
before the Court, the parties were married and Mr. Dahl was 
financially responsible at the time of his death for the mortgage 
payments on the couplefs home and their jointly owed obligations. 
Mrs. Dahl was relying upon this financial assistance from Mr. 
Dahl to maintain her standard of living, thus making her a 
dependent under the provisions of Utah's Workman's Compensation 
Act and entitling her to death benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ERRED IN CONCLUDING CYNTHIA DAHL WAS NOT A DEPENDENT 
OF STEVEN DAHL AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH AND CONSEQUENTLY 
ALSO ERRED IN DENYING HER DEPENDENT'S DEATH BENEFITS 
The Administrative Law Judge should have concluded from the 
evidence presented at the hearing that Mrs. Dahl was a dependent 
of Mr. Dahl at the time of his death, and as such, is entitled to 
dependent's benefits. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68 (2) (b) (iv) (1985) 
provides that a surviving spouse of a deceased employee is 
conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a six-year 
period following the employee's death. The statute provides: 
For purposes of any dependency determination, 
a surviving spouse of a deceased employee 
shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly 
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dependent for a six-year period from the date 
of death of the employee. 
Under Tuom v. Duane Hall Trucking, 675 P.2d at 1200 (Utah 
1984), the Utah Supreme Court determined that this statutory 
provision must be read in conjunction with the limitations of 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-71. Under § 35-1-71, where a spouse is not 
living with the decedent at the time of his death, 
[T]he question of dependency, in whole or in part, 
shall be determined in accordance with the facts 
in each particular case existing at the time of 
the injury or death of such employee. Id. 
Because Mrs. Dahl was living in Colorado when her husband 
died, her dependency is to be determined in light of all the 
facts and circumstances existing at the time of Steven Dahl's 
death. 
This Court elaborated the requirements of this dependency 
test in Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d 807 (Utah 
1975). In Farnsworth, the Industrial Commission had denied 
benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act to the father of a 
deceased minor workman. The issue on appeal was whether the 
father was dependent upon his son within the meaning of 
§ 31-1-71. In interpreting this provision as requiring financial 
dependency, this Court stated: 
The case law of this state has consistently 
limited dependency to those fact situations 
wherein the deceased has contributed finan-
cial assistance or comparable assistance. . . 
which was used in supporting a dependent. 
Id. at 898-99. 
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The Court went on to specify the requisite extent of this financial 
dependency, and concluded that absolute dependency is not necessary 
so long as the applicant had relied on the decedent as a means of 
maintaining the standard of living to which the claimant was 
accustomed. The Court stated: 
[Dependency within the terms of the statute 
does not mean absolute dependency for the 
necessities of life, but rather that the 
applicant looked to and relied on the con-
tributions of the workman, in whole or in 
part, as a means of supporting and main-
taining himself in accordance with his social 
position and accustomed mode of life. Id. at 
899. 
Thus, the test for dependency under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act requires a claimant to establish he relied, in whole or in 
part, on the workman's contributions in order to maintain his 
accustomed standard of living. In the present case, the 
Administrative Law Judge did not use this standard to determine 
Mrs. Dahl's dependency and did not consider the Dahls' accustomed 
standard of living to be relevant. 
More importantly, the Administrative Law Judge narrowly 
interpreted the word "support11 to mean something akin to monetary 
contributions to a spouse for food and clothing only. He disre-
garded the fact that "support" can also mean and include 
agreements to pay debts for which a dependent spouse may be 
obligated. 
A closer reading of the file will indicate 
that the Applicant, in her Stipulation did 
not request any support whatsoever, in fact, 
she waived alimony forever. Further, in the 
Stipulation that she signed on July 23, 1985, 
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she agreed that she was not entitled to any 
alimony ever. But for the death of the 
deceased, the Applicant would have been 
divorced from Mr. Dahl and would have been 
entitled to take nothing. Therefore, it 
cannot be said that Mrs. Dahl had any type of 
reasonable expectation of support from the 
deceased, rather, she quite clearly agreed 
that she would not have any expectation of 
support, by waiving her alimony, which is 
support. . . 
To summarize then, the Applicant and the 
deceased entered into an Agreement whereby 
each was to pay his own obligations and one 
half of the joint and several obligations of 
the parties incurred during the marriage. 
For the Applicant to characterize the 
Agreement as one of support, is to ignore the 
obvious intent of the parties as evidenced by 
their Agreement of July 23, 19 85. That 
intent was that the parties were to be 
divorced and Mrs. Dahl would not be entitled 
to any support and neither would Mr. Dahl 
[R.178-179]. (See Exhibit "C" of the Addendum 
to this Brief.) 
In this case, the obligation on the home was owed by both 
parties and Mr. Dahl had agreed to assume that debt and others 
and hold Mrs. Dahl harmless from them. Mr. Dahl's premature 
death automatically shifted all of those obligations entirely to 
Mrs. Dahl - obligations she would not have had to pay if Mr. Dahl 
had not been killed. 
Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion, the 
word "support" must be more broadly interpreted to include items 
in addition to direct monetary support such as alimony and in 
this case, Mr. Dahl's agreement to assume certain marital 
obligations clearly falls within the meaning of "support." 
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The Farnsworth case goes on to cite an earlier Utah Supreme 
Court decision, Rigby v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 454, 286 
P.628 (1930), as an example of this dependency test practically 
applied. In Rigby, the court held that the plaintiff, the father 
of a deceased workman, had to establish that at the time of the 
injury: 
(1) [P]laintiff relied upon his son, in whole 
or in part, for his support and maintenance; 
(2) that had the son not been killed, plain-
tiff would in all probability have received 
some assistance from his son; (3) that it was 
reasonably necessary for the son to render 
his father some financial aid in order that 
the father might continue to live in a 
condition suitable and becoming to his 
station in life. Id., at 899. (Emphasis 
added.) 
While both Rigby and Farnsworth involve a dependent parent, the 
burden of proof is the same for cases involving a dependent 
spouse and "dependency" need not be strictly limited to a direct 
cash contributions to the dependent person, but can also include 
indirect financial contributions such as payment of debts. 
Therefore, in the present case, Mrs. Dahl only had to prove 
that she was wholly or partly dependent upon the contributions of 
Steven Dahl at the time of his death in order to maintain her 
position in life. Mrs. Dahl clearly met her burden. 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
dependency in Tuom v. Duane Hall Trucking, supra. In Tuom, the 
parties became married under Idaho common law in 1971 and 
separated in June of 19 80 because Mr. Tuom was seeing another 
woman. Mrs. Tuom moved in with her family in Idaho, and Mr. Tuom 
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lived with the other woman in Utah. During the fourteen-month 
separation, the parties saw one another on three occasions and 
maintained approximately monthly telephone contact. In addition, 
Mr. Tuom made three lump-sum payments to his wife during the 
first five months of the separation. He made no payments during 
the nine months directly preceding his death. In her appeal of 
the Industrial Commission's denial of benefits, this Court 
determined that Mrs. Tuom must show, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-71, that the facts established she was dependent upon Mr. 
Tuom at the time of his death. The Court went on to hold that 
the Industrial Commission had erred in denying benefits to Mrs. 
Tuom. In construing § 35-1-71(2), the Court concluded that, 
because dependency is a question of fact, 
[T]he trier of fact should consider acts 
covering at least a period of one year prior 
to the decedent's death in order that all 
evidence bearing on dependency can be viewed 
in terms of its effect over and in relation 
to a significant period of time. ^d. at 1203. 
Further, during this time period, the Court noted that partial 
dependency does not turn upon: 
[W]hether the decedent made a support payment 
on the day or week or even the month of his 
injury or death. . .. The benefits of this 
statute are not limited to those whose 
support came in a steady, even stream up to a 
short time before the employee's death. 
Persons whose support was paid in a lump-sum 
in advance or in irregular payments should 
also qualify. Id. 
The Administrative Law Judge was also in error in assuming 
that Mrs. Dahl had waived her right to alimony and, therefore, 
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was no longer dependent on Mr. Dahl for support. Any such waiver 
was conditional at best. The Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 
"A" of the Addendum to this Brief) was subject to approval of the 
Court - approval that was never given. 
Section 78-45-3, Utah Code Ann, provides that: "Every man 
shall support his child; and he shall support his wife when she 
is in need." Id.. This duty of support is not terminated until 
the marriage is terminated through a Decree of Divorce. No 
Decree of Divorce had been entered in this case and, until such a 
judicial determination occurred, Mrs. Dahl had the right to claim 
support from her husband. 
Further, any Settlement Agreement in a divorce action is 
subject to the review and final approval of the Trial Court. 
(See, Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah 1977).) Therefore, 
since no such approval had been given, the Administrative Law 
Judge was also in error when he concluded in his findings, based 
upon pure speculation, that "But for the death of the deceased, 
the Applicant would have been divorced and would have been 
entitled to take nothing" [R.178]. 
In the case presently before this Court, the evidence 
clearly supported a finding that Mrs. Dahl was a dependent under 
the meaning of that term as used in the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. While Steven Dahl did not provide monthly support payments, 
he did make major contributions to the couple's jointly-owed 
obligations. The payments toward the mortgage on their home and 
towards their debts constituted support necessary to maintain 
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Cynthia Dahl's position in life and he clearly still had a duty 
to support his wife, Mrs. Dahl. 
As this Court stated in Farnsworth: 
When. . .the established facts and inferences 
reasonably deductible therefrom can lead to 
but one conclusion, a question of law is 
presented which this court, upon proper 
application, must review. Ici. at 899. 
The evidence presented to the Industrial Commission can lead to 
but one conclusion. The contributions being made by Steven Dahl 
at the time of his death towards the couple's jointly-owed 
obligations constitute financial support necessary for Cynthia 
Dahl to maintain her accustomed manner of living. At the time of 
his death, she was, as a matter of law, his wife and a dependent 
under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-71 and, therefore, she is entitled to 
dependent's benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
As is clearly evidenced from the comments of the 
Administrative Law Judge and the content of his decision, he 
simply did not understand the concept of support as it related to 
a marriage which might have, but had not yet, ended in a divorce. 
He first thought that no support was appropriate because the 
marriage was over [R.21], even though a Decree of Divorce had not 
yet been entered. 
THE COURT: Because, if she is not 
legally married, then the case law won't 
support an award [R.49]. 
Secondly, he limited the definition of support only to Mrs. 
Dahl's right to support, i.e., alimony, not any other financial 
obligations Mr. Dahl might have to Mrs. Dahl, such as payment of 
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marital debts [R.178]. (See Exhibit "B" of the Addendum to this 
Brief.) 
Thirdly he was not cognizant of the law that any waiver by 
Mrs. Dahl to claim alimony from her husband was at best condi-
tional until such waiver of support and termination of Mr. Dahlfs 
duty of support had been officially approved by the Court and 
incorporated into a Decree of Divorce. 
Individually and cumulatively, these misconceptions of the 
law led the Administrative Law Judge to erroneously conclude that 
Mrs. Dahl was in no way dependent upon her husband for support at 
the time of his death and consequently he committed reversible 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission 
erred in denying Dependent's Death Benefits to Cynthia Dahl under 
the Workman's Compensation Act after her husband was killed in 
the course of his employment. 
The Administrative Law Judge erroneously adopted the narrow 
construction of the word "support" to encompass only payments 
such as alimony or monies paid for daily necessities and not 
payments related to debt assumption. The word "support" should 
have been construed more broadly to include a consideration of 
what joint debts Mr. Dahl was paying and what effect his failure 
to do so would have on the lifestyle of Mrs. Dahl. In the case 
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before the Court, Mr. Dahl was financially responsible at the 
time of his death for the mortgage payments on the couple's home 
and their jointly owed debt obligations. Mrs. Dahl relied on 
this financial assistance to maintain her standard of living, 
thus making her a dependent under the provisions of Utah's 
Workman's Compensation Act. 
This Court should reverse the Order of the Industrial 
Commission affirming the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and find that Cynthia Dahl was a 
dependent of Steven Dahl at the time of his death. The Order of 
September 3, 1985, awarding no death benefits, should be reversed, 
and Cynthia Dahl should be awarded Dependent's Death Benefits 
under Utah's Workman's Compensation Act and her costs related to 
this appeal, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this y day of November, 19 86. 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for PlaintLff/appellant 
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN BRADLEY DAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CYNTHIA ZOE DAHL, 
Defendant. 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND 
SEPARATION AGREEMENT 
Civil NO. D-85-38 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-named parties hereby stipulate and agree as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, and has been such for a period in excess of three months 
prior to the filing of the Complaint. 
2. The Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife 
having been married on the 22nd day of October, 1978, in Aurora, 
Colorado. 
3. No children have been born as issue of this marriage 
and none are expected. 
4. During the course of the marriage, the Defendant has 
treated Plaintiff cruelly causing him great mental distress and 
making it totally impossible to continue the marriage 
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relat ionship. 
5. Neither party is entitled to alimony and none should 
be awarded and the rights thereto should be entirely set aside. 
6. During the course of the marriage, the parties have 
acquired an interest in a home and real property located at the 
street address commonly referred to as 11551 South Hidden Valley 
Boulevard, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The parties agree 
that the home and real property has a current equity of 
$23,214.00. The parties agree that each party should be awarded 
an interest in the home and real property equal to one-half the 
equity of the parties therein after deducting the reasonable 
expenses of sale and closing which the parties agree shall be 
equal to seven percent (7%) of the value of the home, which, it 
is aqreed by the parties, it equal to $95,500.00. Plaintiff will 
pay Defendant for her share of the equity in the home and real 
property of the parties, in full, on or before the 1st day of 
August, 1985. The Defendant shall execute a Quit Claim Deed in 
favor of the Plaintiff and shall be granted a recordable lien 
representing her interest in the equity of the parties. The 
Plaintiff is awarded the sole custody and possession of the home 
and real property of the parties subject to Defendant's interest 
as set forth herein. Plaintiff shall bear the sole and separate 
responsibility for the home mortgage installments. 
7. The parties aqree to pay, in equal amounts, the 
following debts and obligations, in the amounts as they appeared 
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as of the 20th day of December, 1984, such* that each parties' 
share will be approximately $3,358.64: - A. <-\'i 
a. VISA - Rocky Mountain 
b. Fashion Bar 
c. Nordstroms 
d. J.C. Penney 
e. Weinstocks 
f. BON 
g. Sears 
h. Bohm Allen 
i. K.G. Mens Store 
j. VISA - Salt Lake City, Utah. 
k. ZCMI 
1. Bank Loan 
m. Mervyns 
8. In the event the Defendnt does not pay the 
obligations and debts as set. forth herein, then the amount that 
Defendant agreed to pay, and did not pay will be deducted from 
her share of the home equity prior to the payment thereof to 
Defendant. 
9. The Defendant agrees to return all credit cards in 
her possession for which the Plaintiff may be jointly liable. 
10. The parties agree and stipulate that as of December 
20, 1984, the home payments were three months in arrears. The 
parties agree to divide equally the liability for those three 
Page -3-
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months home payments and, in the event that one party or the 
other has paid those payments, then the other party will 
reimburse him or her for 50% of that amount* In the event that 
Plaintiff pays those three months home payments and the Defendant 
fails to reimburse him for one-half of that amount, then that 
amount will be deducted from the share of Defendant's home equity 
of the parties. 
11. The parties agree to hold the other harmless as to 
the debts and obligations assumed by that party in this 
agreement. 
12. During the course of the marriage the parties have 
acquired certin items of personal property which should be 
divided between the parties as follows: 
TO THE PLAINTIFF: 
a. All personal property brought into the 
marriage. 
b. All gifts from the Defendant. 
c. Major household appliances including 
washer/dryer and refrigerator. 
d. Fifty percent of the marriage gifts. 
e. Plaintiff's personal effects and clothing. 
f. The personal property presently located at the 
home of the parties subject to those items designated to 
belong to the Defendant hereafter. 
TO THE DEFENDANT: 
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a. All personal property brought into the marriage 
by Defendant. 
b. All gifts from the Plaintiff. 
c. Fifty percent of the marriage gifts. 
d. Defendant's personal property and clothing. 
e. Housekeeping items such as pots, pans, towels, 
and sheets, etc., be agreement of the parties. 
f. The Defendant's gifts from her father including 
antiques presently in the posBOHfilon of t h<> MnlnUrr. 
13. In addition to the personal property reforrud to 
above, the Defendant shall be awarded the interest of the parties 
in the 1984 Pontiac Fiero in possession of the Defendant subject 
to any indebtedness thereon which Defendant shall pay and hold 
the Plaintiff harmless thereon. 
14. The parties should be awarded his or her own 
separate savings accounts, checking accounts, money market 
accounts, credit union accounts and the like, if any, without any 
claim by the other. 
15. Each party should be awarded his or her own 
retirement, pension, or profit sharing plan, if any, free of any 
claim by the other. 
16. Each party will pay his or her own attorney's fees 
incurred in the bringing and prosectution of this matter or its 
defense. 
17. This Agreement shall not be deemed a condonation by 
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either party of the act or acts claimed by either party to have 
caused the differences leading to the parties' separation, 
18. No modification or waiver of any of the terms of 
this Agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by the 
party to be charged. No waiver of any breach or default 
hereunder shall be deemed a waiver of any subsequent breach or 
default of the same or similar nature. 
19. Each party hereby specifically agrees to cooperate 
with the other, through counsel or otherwise, to effect changes 
in title to property agreed to be divided hereunder, to change 
the names and responsibilities for payment on the charge accounts 
and other way necessary to be proper to insure that the Agreement 
entered into is carried out in every detail. 
20. In the event ether party to this Agreement defaults 
in his or her obligations hereunder, the party in default shall 
be liable to the other for all reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees incurred in the enforcement of the obligations 
created by this Agreement. 
21. The parties agree that this Agreement is a complete 
settlement of all rights either party may have in the other's 
property whether presently existing or hereafter aquired. 
22. The above-named Defendant specifically stipulates 
and acknowledges as follows: 
a. That the Defendant agrees to allow her default 
to be entered on Plaintiff's Complaint subject to the 
Pxav -6-
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terms and provisions of this Settlement Agreement; 
b. That said Defendant understands that the court 
may, for good cause shown, waive the ninety-daty waiting 
period provided by Section 30-3-18 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) and immediately hold a hearing upon the Complaint 
and enter Judgment against said Defendant without further 
notice and that said Defendnt consents to the same and, 
in fact believes it to be in the best interest of the 
parties to waive said period and requests the Court to 
waive said period; 
c. That said Defendant further understands that the 
Court may, for good cause shown, waive the three months 
waiting period providing by Section 30-3-7 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) and order that the Decree may become 
absolute upon entry and that, believing it to be in the 
best interests of both parties, said Defendant further 
requests the Court to waive the same; 
d. That Frederick N. Green, attorney for Plaintiff, 
represents only the Plaintiff in this matter and does not 
represent the Defendant for any purpose at any time; and 
e. That the above acknowledgements and stipulations 
are dependent upon and made in contemplation of the 
parties aqreeing to and executing this Settlemebnt 
Agreement and the same being approved by the Court. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have hereunder set their 
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hand on t h i s 2. ^ d a y of 7, Uli/ 1985. 
DATED this ^ r day of L2L(^U 
"T 7 
1985. 
GREEN & BERRY 
tEDERICK N. GREEN 
attorney for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
) ss. 
On the J?Stk day of C ^ X ^ 1985, before me, the 
undersigned officer, personally7appeared Steven Bradley Dahl who 
is known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
within instrument and individually acknowledged that he executed 
the same for the purposes therein contained. 
In witness whereof, I have Jiereunto set my hand and 
official seal this JL?/£L day of C L ^ W , 1985. 
£.^-*}Sl>y XZ7^~L'L^'^ 
My commission expires 
^ ^ c 7, 
Notary -Publ ic n 
Residing ^ 11 v^i.xX^
 c 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
PAUL LIAPIS 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t 
CYNTHIA ,ZOR DAHL 
STATR OF UTAH 7/&& 
Pano - 8 -
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) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the ^^rdj day of v^JLx^ / 1985, before me, the 
undersigned officer, personally appeared Cynthia Zoe Dahl who is 
known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
within instrument and individually acknowledged that he executed 
the same for the purposes therein contained. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
official seal this
 CP23ACQ d a v o f T)LJJJJ^ / 1985. t 
My commission expires: 
JK38 ye2o7 
STATi O F urm ) ^ 
OOUNTY Of tALT LAKI ) ^ 
i, TH* UMDCfWGNEO, 0LE9K Of TH€ OBTWCT 
OOUPCT Of 8A4.T LAK£ COUNTY, UTAH, DO HE3EEY 
C^JTIfY THAT TH* AX**XED A*D *OKEGOtNG fc 
A TWU€ AND PAL COO' Of AM Cfl'GINAL DOCU-
U&m OH RLE >N MY Of f ICC AS SUCH CLERK. 
WTNS8S MY HAND AND SEAL Of SAJO OOURT 
TH16 n? DAY Of ~>>V*.*^£*i^ 16 S% 
H. DWCON KINpLfY. Oj i f lK 
BPY / ^^^<^ /L^^r DEPUTY 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
EDWARD ALTER, State Treasurer * 
and Custodian of the DEFAULT * 
INDEMNITY FUND and the INDUSTRIAL * 
COMMISSION of UTAH, * 
Applicants, * 
* D E A T H B E N E F I T S O R D E R 
v. * 
REVLON SERVICE, INC. * 
and/or LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE * 
COMPANY * 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
WHEREAS, Steve Dahl was fatally injured as the result of an accident 
arising out of or in the course of his employment with Revlon Service, Inc. on 
August 2, 1985. 
WHEREAS, Section 35-1-68 (2) (a), U. C. A., provides that if the 
Commission has reasonably determined that there are no dependents of a 
deceased employee, it may issue an Order for the employer or insurance carrier 
to pay into the Default Indemnity Fund the sum of $30,000.00. In the event no 
dependency claim is filed within one year from the date of death, this Order 
shall become permanent and final, and 
WHEREAS, the Commission has reasonably determined that there are no 
dependents and desires to have the statutory amount herein above stated paid 
into the Default Indemnity Fund, and further, the Commission is of the opinion 
that the statutory funeral allowance of $1,800.00 should also be paid, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the defendants pay to the Default 
Indemnity Fund, c/o Edward Alter, State Treasurer, the sum of $30,000.00 for 
the use and benefit of the Default Indemnity Fund. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any claim made by undetermined or potential 
dependents of the deceased must be made within one year from the date of death 
or the funds herein ordered paid to the Default Indemnity Fund shall become 
the property of the Default Indemnity Fund without further order of the 
Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants pay the statutory funeral 
allowance. 
2 
STEVE DAHL, Deceased 
DEATH BENEFITS ORDER 
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Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of UtaJ*, Salt Lakp qity. Utah this 
.fy^ day of /h%m/J&r^ 1985. 
Stephen M. Hadley, Chairman 
Walter T. Axelgard, Commissioner 
L. L. Nielsen, Commissioner 
ATTEST: 
Linda J. 
Commissi 
isburg 
'Secretary 
83074 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85001103 
CYNTHIA DAHL, widow of 
STEVE DAHL, 
deceased, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
REVLON SERVICE, INCORPORATED and/or 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE and/or 
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 12, 
1986, at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The Applicant was present and represented by Frank J. 
Gustin, Attorney at Law. 
The Defendants, Revlon Service, Incorporated and/or 
Liberty Mutual Insurance, were represented by Tracy 
Birdsong, Adjustor. 
The Default Indemnity Fund was represented by Suzan 
Pixton, Administrator. 
On September 3, 1985, the Commission entered a Death Benefits Order 
finding that there were no dependents of the deceased at the time of his 
death, and that the sum of $30,000.00 should be paid into the Default 
Indemnity Fund. On December 12, 1985, the Applicant filed an Application for 
Death Benefits, indicating that she was the surviving spouse of the deceased 
and as such, entitled to death benefits. A Hearing was held in the matter and 
being fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is prepared 
to enter the following: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* FINDINGS OF FACT 
* 
* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
* 
* AND ORDER 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
0
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The Applicant herein, Cynthia Dahl, married Steve Dahl in October of 
1978 in Denver, Colorado. At that time, the deceased was not employed but did 
secure employment a few months after the marriage. At the time of the 
marriage, the Applicant was working as a Flight Attendant with Frontier 
Airlines. In September of 1979, the Applicant and the deceased moved to Salt 
Lake City and bought a home in Sandy. 
On February 6, 1984, the decedent had a heart attack and following 
the same, his attitude changed towards his wife. She testified that he became 
more of a "workaholic" after his heart attack and that they no longer had a 
sex life following his heart attack, which she attributed to his medication. 
The deceased also advised Mrs. Dahl that he did not want to have children and 
they no longer did things together or socialized. In November of 1984, the 
Applicant left the marital home, which was in a joint tenancy and moved to the 
Denver area, where she moved in with a co-worker. The Applicant left her car 
in Salt Lake City but took all of her clothes with her. She testified that 
she talked on the phone with the decedent and that when he was in Denver, they 
would have dinner or breakfast together. She testified that she felt they 
were still making efforts towards reconciliation and that as a result, she was 
shocked when in January of 1985, Mr. Dahl filed a complaint of divorce against 
her, alleging mental cruelty. Prior to the filing of the complaint of 
divorce, the Applicant sent $200.00 a month to the deceased for the months of 
November and December of 1984 and January of 1985 for payment of their joint 
obligations incurred during the marriage. Following the filing of the divorce 
complaint and after she had retained legal counsel, the Applicant made no 
further payments to the deceased. 
In March of 1985, Applicant, by and through counsel, filed a Motion 
for an Order to Show Cause, regarding temporary support and other related 
matters and at that time, the Applicant was seeking temporary support in the 
amount of $750.00 per month. In reviewing that Motion in light of the 
Applicant's testimony at the time of the evidentiary hearing, the 
Administrative Law Judge has serious doubts about the truthfulness and 
accuracy of that document. For example, at the time of the Hearing, the 
Applicant testified under oath that she was paying her roommate in Denver rent 
of $200.00 per month. However, in the Motion she represents that she was 
paying $300.00 per month. The Administrative Law Judge is of the opinion that 
the Motion and the expenses contained therein were "padded" for the purpose of 
leverage during the litigation. Following the filing of the Motion, the 
counsel for the parties then had several communications and the Motion was 
never heard by the District Court because the parties, for all intents and 
purposes, had placed the case in a posture of eventual settlement. 
Thereafter, the Applicant instructed her attorney to prepare a 
Separation Agreement and Stipulated Property Settlement to settle the matter. 
Her attorney did so and submitted that Agreement to the other party. It is 
*>yfz 
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interesting to note in that Agreement that the Applicant had waived the 90 day 
waiting period as provided by law, contrary to her testimony that she was 
still actively engaged in reconciliation with the deceased. If this had truly 
been the case, then it would seem that she would not have waived that period, 
since the intent of the Legislature in enacting the waiting period provision 
is for the very purpose of allowing parties the opportunity to reconcile. 
That stipulation of the Applicants also provided that the deceased would 
retain possession of the family home for the purpose of selling the same and 
then the proceeds from the sale would be divided equally between the parties, 
with the Applicant's attorney indicating that, by his calculations, she would 
have received $2,500.00 as her share of the equity in the family home. The 
Agreement went on to provide that each party would pay their own debts and the 
Applicant would keep her car and pay the indebtedness thereon, even though it 
was a joint obligation. The most telling provision in the Applicant's 
Agreement was her waiving of any alimony whatsoever. The Applicant testified 
that she did not like the terms of the stipulation, although the same had been 
prepared at her direction and she was still not desirous of the divorce. 
In response to her stipulation, the deceased had his attorney prepare 
a Property Settlement and Separation Agreement. That Agreement provided that 
the deceased would retain possession of the home, for the purpose of selling 
the same, and that he would make one half of the payment for the 3 month 
arrearages and that the Applicant would make the other half and in the event 
that either of the parties paid the full payments, then they would reimburse 
the other party for their half of that amount. The parties also agreed that 
each party would be responsible for their own separate credit cards and other 
obligations and Applicant was to return any joint credit cards in her 
possession. With respect to the joint obligations of the parties incurred 
during the marriage, each party was liable for one half of those debts. The 
Agreement also provided that in the event either party did not pay their share 
of the marital obligations, then that amount could be deducted from that 
partie's share of the equity from the home. The stipulation also divided the 
personal property of the parties and again the Applicant waived any and all 
right to the alimony whatsoever. Finally, the 90-day waiting period was also 
waived and the Applicant agreed that her default could be entered at any time 
in the matter. This Property Settlement and Separation Agreement was sent to 
the Applicant and her attorney in April of 1985. 
In July of 1985, the deceased contacted the Applicant and informed 
her that he still wanted the divorce and that unless she signed the Property 
Settlement and Separation Agreement, he would contact his attorney and have a 
trial date set for the purpose of litigating the divorce. The Applicant 
executed the Agreement in the presence of a Notary Public on July 23, 1985, 
and returned it to the deceased. The deceased and his attorney then executed 
the Agreement on July 26, 1985, and it was subsequently filed with the court 
on August 5, 1985. The deceased met his demise on August 2, 1985. As a 
result of his demise, the Applicant, by and through counsel, now argues that 
the Property Settlement and Separation Agreement she executed on July 23, 1985, 
177 
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is totally worthless and without any legal effect whatsoever. 
The Applicant, in seeking to recover benefits as the surviving 
spouse, places reliance on the Supreme Court case of Donita Tuom vs. Duane 
Hall Trucking. 675 P2d 1200 (Utah 1984). In reviewing the fact of that case, 
the Administrative Law Judge notes a very important distinguishing factor 
between the Tuom case and the instant case at bar. In Tuom, the deceased and 
his wife had separated in June of 1980, after contracting a common law 
marriage in Idaho in 19 71. The deceased moved in with another woman but 
continued to maintain at least monthly telephone contact with the wife and he 
paid her three lump sum payments and allowed her the use of a truck. However, 
the important feature of the Tuom case is that "neither took any formal steps 
to terminate their marriage relationship.** By comparison, the deceased took 
the formal step of filing a complaint for divorce against the Applicant for 
mental cruelty and the Applicant retained counsel and instructed her counsel 
to prepare a Motion for Temporary Support and a Stipulated Property 
Settlement. Accordingly, rather than showing some intent to reconcile, the 
parties in this case, by their actions, evidenced the exact opposite. 
Although the Applicant testified that she felt they were making efforts 
towards reconciliation, it is clear to the Administrative Law Judge that her 
actions belie this fact and, further, the Administrative Law Judge does not 
believe her self-serving testimony in this regard. 
Pursuant to the Tuom case, the Applicant, in order to be entitled to 
benefits, must prove that she was dependent either in whole or in part on 
support from the deceased. The evidence on the file does not support the 
Applicant's contention. Rather first, the Applicant must prove that she was 
relying on her husband for her support. The evidence on the file does not 
support this contention. Rather, for the first three months of her 
separation, the Applicant was supporting the deceased, by sending him payments 
of $200.00 per month to help with the joint obligations of the parties 
incurred during the marriage. After the deceased filed his complaint of 
divorce and after the Applicant retained legal counsel, she then terminated 
these support payments, if you will, and then counter-claimed for monthly 
support of $750.00. Other than this one Motion for Temporary Support, this is 
the only reference in the file whatsoever to any desire of the Applicant to 
receive support. A closer reading of the file will indicate that the 
Applicant, in her Stipulation did not request any support whatsoever, in fact, 
she waived alimony forever. Further, in the Stipulation that she signed on 
July 23, 1985, she agreed that she was not entitled to any alimony ever. But 
for the death of the deceased, the Applicant would have been divorced from Mr. 
Dahl and would have been entitled to take nothing. Therefore, it cannot be 
said that Mrs. Dahl had any type of reasonable expectation of support from the 
deceased, rather, she quite clearly agreed that she would not have any 
expectation of support, by waiving her alimony, which is support. 
-5 
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Finally, the deceased was not providing financial aid to Mrs. Dahl to 
support her in her lifestyle. Rather, the parties after negotiations with the 
benefit of legal counsel arrived at a Property Settlement and Separation 
Agreement, whereby the parties settled their joint obligations and their 
separate obligations. Each party agreed to pay those bills that they had 
incurred and they further agreed that each would be liable for one half of the 
obligations that had been incurred during the marriage. In other words, Mrs. 
Dahl assumed liability for her own debts as did Mr. Dahl. There was no 
agreement for support, because Mrs. Dahl was not claiming any support. During 
1984, Mrs. Dahl worked 10 months and earned $20,000.00. In 1985, Mrs. Dahl 
worked 9 months and earned $20,000.00 and had she worked the rest of the year, 
it is fair to interpolate that she would have made $29,000.00. Income at this 
level was sufficient to support the Applicant. In fact, she lived on her 
income while she was in the Denver area and there was no evidence the deceased 
was paying her ongoing expenses. As indicated earlier, the Administrative Law 
Judge does not believe the figures set forth in the Motion for Temporary 
Support which are said to represent the Applicant's expenses. 
To summarize then, the Applicant and the deceased entered into an 
Agreement whereby each was to pay his own obligations and one half of the 
joint and several obligations of the parties incurred during the marriage. 
For the Applicant to characterize the Agreement as one of support, is to 
ignore the obvious intent of the parties as evidenced by their Agreement of 
July 23, 1985. That intent was that the parties were to be divorced and Mrs. 
Dahl would not be entitled to any support and neither would Mr. Dahl. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
At the time of his death, Steve Dahl was not living with Cynthia Dahl 
nor was he supporting her. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of September 3, 1985, awarding 
no dependent death benefits to the Default Indemnity Fund should be and the 
same is hereby reaffirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claim of Cynthia Dahl for dependent's 
benefits should be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or ft^ g^ al. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah this 
^ a y of March, 1986. 
i^_ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on March / 7^ 1986, a copy of the attached 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in the case of Cynthia Dahl 
issued March //^ 1986, was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
Cynthia Dahl, 11551 South Hidden Valley Blvd, Sandy, UT 84092 
Frank J. Gustin, Atty., 48 Post Office Place, 3rd Floor 
SLC, UT 84101 
Liberty Mutual Insurance, Box 45440, SLC, UT 84145-00440 
Suzan Pixton, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
Revlon Service, Incorporated, 767 5th Avenue, New York, N.Y. 
10153 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By ---Z^W^^ 
Carol Olson 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
A INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CASE No,85001103 
* 
* 
CYNTHIA DAHL, Widow of, * 
STEVE DAHL, Deceased, * 
* 
Applicant, * DENIAL OF MOTION 
* 
vs. * FOR REVIEW 
* 
REVLON SERVICE, Inc. and/or * 
LIBERTY MUTUAL and/or * 
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On March 17, 1986, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission 
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order denying the 
widow/applicant in the above captioned case dependency death benefits. The 
Administrative Law Judge determined no benefits were due as the conclusive 
presumption regarding dependency was not applicable, and because there was 
insufficient evidence to show the widow/applicant was dependent on the 
deceased husband. On March 26, 1986, the attorney for the applicant filed a 
Motion for Review claiming the Administrative Law Judge had emphasized certain 
unreliable evidence, and ignored other evidence showing dependency in arriving 
at his decision. The Commission is of the opinion that the Administrative Law 
Judge correctly found no dependency death benefits were due the applicant. 
The attorney for the applicant initially set forth argument that 
dependency benefits should be awarded in a pre-hearing memorandum of points 
and authorities. In that memorandum, the counsel for the applicant 
acknowledges that the two statutory provisions governing the determination of 
dependency are U.C.A. 35-1-68 and U.C.A. 35-1-71. The attorney concludes that 
the Utah Supreme Court case Tuom vs. Duane Hall Trucking. 675 P.2d 1200 (Utah 
1984) requires that the two above cited statutory sections must be read 
together so that the result is that a conclusive presumption of dependency is 
appropriate only where the marital partners were living together at the time 
of death. This, the attorney for the applicant concedes, was not the case in 
the instant matter, as the widow/applicant had left the marital residence in 
Salt Lake City, Utah approximately one year prior to her husband's death in 
August 1985. Conceding the inapplicability of the conclusive presumption of 
dependency, the attorney for the applicant maintained that this did not 
prevent a finding that the Applicant was dependent on her husband, as other 
evidence existed to show dependency. The counsel for the applicant stated 
that the applicant originally sought a Court Order requiring the husband to 
provide her with certain support during the pendency of the divorce, but later 
agreed to settle for the husband's assumption of the mortgage and other debt 
payments which were the joint responsibility of the widow/applicant and her 
husband. This, the attorney for the applicant maintains, shows that the 
applicant was dependent on her husband at the time of his death. 
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In the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order, the Administrative Law Judge finds the above referenced 
evidence of dependency insufficient in light of the other surrounding 
circumstances. The Administrative Law Judge lists five separate reasons why 
he could not find that the widow/applicant was dependent on the husband. 
First, the Administrative Law Judge notes that the applicant sent her husband 
$200.00 per month for the first three months of the couple's separation in 
order to assist her husband in the mortgage and other debt payments for which 
the two had joint liability. The Administrative Law Judge notes that these 
payments were stopped once the husband filed for divorce, but that there was 
no evidence she was financially incapable of continuing to make the payments. 
The Administrative Law Judge found that the fact that the widow/applicant 
voluntarily made these payments is not consistent with a finding that she was 
dependent on the husband to whom she made the payments. Second, the 
Administrative Law Judge notes that the proposed Motion for temporary support, 
prepared by the applicant and her attorney prior to the divorce trial, 
contained a list of the applicant's monthly expenses which was in conflict 
with certain testimony the applicant gave at the Industrial Commission 
hearing. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge found that the written list 
of monthly expenses in that proposal was not reliable evidence that the 
applicant was, in fact, dependent on her husband during the separation. 
Third, the Administrative Law Judge refers to the two proposed divorce 
settlement agreements prepared respectively by counsel for the applicant and 
counsel for the husband. The Administrative Law Judge states that the two 
proposals both suggest settlement based on a more or less even distribution of 
property as well as an even distribution of the jointly incurred debt. The 
Administrative Law Judge maintains this demonstrates neither spouse was 
dependent on the other. Fourth, the Administrative Law Judge notes that there 
is no evidence in the proposed settlement agreements or other divorce 
proceedings that the Applicant ever sought alimony as she predictably would 
have if she felt herself dependent on her husband. Finally, the 
Administrative Law Judge notes that at the time of the separation, the 
Applicant was employed in the same job she had since her marriage, which job 
paid upwards of $20,000.00 per year. 
In the Applicant's March 26, 1986 Motion for Review, the counsel for 
the Applicant argues that the Administrative Law Judge placed unwarranted 
emphasis on the proposed settlement agreements prepared by the couple's 
respective counsel. Counsel for the applicant states the agreements were 
never actually entered into, and had been set aside as it was determined a 
trial would be necessary to finalize distribution of the property and debt. 
Counsel for the Applicant states the Administrative Law Judge failed to take 
proper notice of the fact the applicant and her husband had agreed the husband 
would pay for the jointly incurred obligations during the pendency of the 
divorce proceedings. Finally, counsel for the applicant emphasizes that the 
applicant was not in a position where she could afford to pay off her share of 
the jointly incurred debt without assistance. The counsel for the Applicant 
argues that this is sufficient to show dependency per the Utah Supreme Court 
case Farnsworth vs. The Industrial Commission, 534 P. 2d 807 (Utah 1975) and 
that the applicant need not show she could not pay her living expenses in 
order to show dependency. 
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The Commission finds that, notwithstanding the fact that the proposed 
settlement agreements were not entered into, the proposed agreements do 
reflect that the two parties felt one was not dependent on the other, in that 
both agreed to a more or less equal distribution of the jointly incurred 
debt. The Applicant's substantial income, and the fact that she lived and 
maintained herself independently during nearly one year of separation, is also 
indication that the applicant was not dependent on the husband. Most 
significant is the fact the applicant voluntarily paid her share of the 
jointly incurred debt during separation up until the divorce suit was filed. 
The Commission finds that all of these factors point to no dependency on the 
part of the applicant, and the Commission therefore finds the Administrative 
Law Judge correctly denied dependency death benefits. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's March 26, 1986, Motion 
for Review, is hereby denied and the Administrative Law Judge's March 17, 1986 
order is hereby affirmed and final. 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
Walter Axelgard // 
Commissioner 
Len io<_Nije 1 sen 
Commissioner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
o f U U h , Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
ATTEST: 
day of May, 1986 
* Linda J. Straiburg 
Commission/Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on May 22 , 1986 a copy of the attached Denial of 
Motion For Review was mailed to the following persons at the following 
addresses, postage paid: 
Cynthia Dahl, 11551 South Hidden Valley Blvd., Sandy, Utah 84092 
Frank J. Gustin, Attorney, 48 Post Office Place, 3rd Floor, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101 
Liberty Mutual Insurance, Box 45440, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0440 
Revlon Service, Inc., 767 5th Avenue, New York, New York, 10153 
Suzan Pixton, Administrator, Default Indemnity Fund 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Barbara 
